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IP Modularity: Profiting from Innovation by Aligning  
Product Architecture with Intellectual Property 
 
Distributed value creation through innovative product and process designs is a key reality 
of the modern world. Firms increasingly practice open innovation, license technology out and in, 
outsource development and production, and enable users and downstream firms to innovate on 
their products.
1 However, while distributed value creation can boost the overall value created, it 
may create serious challenges for capturing value. In order to draw in external contributors, an 
innovator often grants them access to knowledge covering a product or process.
2 The innovator 
thus gives up some of its intellectual property (IP), by waiving legal exclusion rights or by 
revealing formerly exclusive knowledge. But as a result, contributors may appropriate a large 
share of the jointly created value. In turn, integrating external contributions entails the risk of 
becoming dependent on outside owners of IP and thus exposed to holdup.  
How can firms exploit the advantages of distributed value creation while avoiding 
concomitant risks for value capture? Our paper addresses this tension by proposing the concept of 
“IP modularity.” We argue that, by managing a system’s modular structure in conjunction with its 
IP, firms can reconcile opportunities for distributed innovation with their need to capture value. 
That is, the modular architecture of a product or process should not be determined solely by 
technical and organizational criteria, but also by considerations of IP and value capture. A central 
element in our argument is that the structure of a technical system is in large measure under the 
control of the system’s architects. Therefore, the technical architecture of a product or process and 
a firm’s strategy for creating and claiming value are inevitably intertwined. In particular, in a 
modular system, a firm must simultaneously decide on the technical boundaries of the modules 
and the IP deployed in each one. Controlling too much of the system’s IP is problematic if it deters 
innovation by others. But controlling too little—or the wrong parts—may prevent the focal firm 
from capturing value for itself.  
Consider the example of M-Systems, a subsidiary of the leading seller of flash memory 
cards, SanDisk.
3 In 2005, the open source operating system Linux was becoming popular for 
mobile devices. Buyers of flash memory increasingly demanded that the memory’s driver (the 
software that allows it to operate within the mobile device) be made publicly available as open 
source software to simplify development of the host systems. However, M-Systems wanted to  
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protect sensitive IP which was part of the driver. As a solution, M-Systems introduced what we 
call an IP-modular architecture: They split the formerly one-module driver into two modules, 
based solely on IP considerations: the flash management code, and the remaining “thin” driver. 
They placed the former on the physical memory device itself, thus keeping it protected via 
copyright and secrecy, and published the driver as open source software. Redesigning the technical 
modules to be congruent with the desired structure of IP allowed M-Systems to reconcile customer 
demands for openness with its own value appropriation: they kept control of the “essential 
module”
4, the flash management software, and were able to open up a “complementary module,” 
the driver, which exhibited the largest potential for distributed value creation. 
To achieve IP modularity, in which the technical and IP boundaries of modules are 
congruent, system architects must distinguish between the focal firm’s own IP and external IP. The 
case of M-Systems is about the firm’s own IP, since M-Systems owned the IP to the entire original 
driver and then opened up a part of it to outsiders. The following case from the automotive 
industry illustrates how IP modularity works for external IP.  
An automaker sourced a braking system from a supplier, which sold it to several 
customers.
5 Within the automobile, the braking system was both a technical and IP module, since 
it was a physically distinct component and all its IP was owned by the supplier. Then, however, 
the automaker developed a stability control system which relied heavily on features of the braking 
system, in particular on its ABS (antilock braking system). From a strictly technical perspective, it 
would have been optimal to integrate the braking and stability systems into one module. However, 
this module would not have been IP-modular because it would rely on IP from both the supplier 
and the automaker. In the case of an integrated design, the supplier must either sell the integrated 
system to all its customers, or sell two distinct braking systems—one to the automaker who 
provided the IP, and the other to everyone else. The first option was unacceptable to the 
automaker, which considered its proprietary stability system to be an important point of product 
differentiation. The second would have required the brake supplier to maintain two distinct 
products, forgoing economies of scale, and would still have posed risks to the automaker of 
inadvertent loss of critical IP. The automaker instead developed the stability system as a separate 
module, which was added to the braking system during assembly. In other words, to avoid a 
commingling of external IP with its own IP, the automaker adopted an IP-modular design for its 
braking system. In the words of an executive from the auto company: “Sometimes we need to re- 
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segment both hardware and software modules, or the modularity of the system, based more on the 
commercial needs of, say, protecting an in-house algorithm, than on just the most efficient 
design.” 
In this paper, we explain how modularity affects value capture: Under what conditions, and 
how, it can support an innovator in profiting from innovation, and when it should be avoided. To 
this end, we define modularity and show that it enables innovation outside the walls of the focal 
firm. If not carefully handled, the presence of external innovators creates problems of value 
appropriation as discussed by Teece.
6 We then introduce the concept of IP modularity, and explore 
this concept using case studies from various industries. We first address IP modularity related to 
the focal firm’s own IP; then, related to external IP; and finally, IP modularity under uncertainty. 
We derive strategic recommendations for each category.  
Modularity and Profiting from Innovation 
For decentralized innovation and value creation to occur in large systems, it is necessary 
for the parts to be independent so that an innovation in one part of the system will not require 
changes in many other parts.
7 This condition is captured in the concept of modularity. Modularity 
reduces the cognitive burden of complexity, and allows tasks to be partitioned and worked on in 
parallel.
8 With task partitioning, a productive division of labor may arise between individuals 
within one firm or across firm boundaries.
9 The existence of task modules with well-defined 
interfaces reduces transaction costs, thus supporting outsourcing.
10 Finally, changes within 
modules and recombinations of modules are easy in a modular architecture.  
Importantly in our context, modularity in the design of products and processes facilitates 
the division of labor in the innovation process between firms
11—an approach aptly labeled “open 
innovation” by Henry Chesbrough.
12 In a modular system, innovations can more easily be 
introduced by firms other than the creator of the modular architecture—firms in related markets, 
entrepreneurial startups, or even users.
13  
However, the fact that modularity enables innovation “at a distance” from the focal firm 
creates implicit tension between value creation and value appropriation. By granting external 
contributors access to knowledge covering a product or process, the architect of a modular system 
risks losing the lion’s share of value to complementary innovators. For example, the modular 
architecture of IBM’s mainframe computer System/360 allowed the makers of plug-compatible 
peripherals, such as disk drives, to enter the market.
14   
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Also the IBM PC had a highly modular architecture, and in the end most of the value was 
captured by Intel and Microsoft, not IBM.
15 While IBM outsourced most parts of the PC, it kept an 
essential piece of software proprietary, the BIOS (Basic Input Output System). Had the firm 
managed to maintain exclusivity of this essential module, history might have been different (in 
particular if the second source arrangement for CPUs with AMD had worked—more about this 
later). Yet, in 1983 IBM lost this exclusivity when Phoenix Technologies replicated the BIOS, 
enabling the creation of legal “clones” fully compatible with the PC and sold at prices far below 
IBM’s.
16  
Protection of the essential module—in the case of the IBM PC, the BIOS—links the topic 
of modularity to the literature on profiting from innovation, which originated with David Teece’s 
seminal work.
17 According to Teece, the first key driver of a firm’s ability to profit from 
innovation is the difficulty other firms face in imitating the focal innovation. This “appropriability 
regime” in turn is determined by the effectiveness of legal protection mechanisms (patents, 
copyright, and contracts), secrecy, and other mechanisms such as product complexity. For the PC 
BIOS, copyright and secrecy were the relevant mechanisms, but they proved ineffective against 
independent imitation. Relying on the same mechanisms to protect its own essential module—the 
flash management software—M-System was more successful.  
The second key driver is the control of complementary assets, which are defined as 
capabilities or assets required for the successful commercialization of an innovation. Typical 
examples of complementary assets are distribution channels, a brand name, or competitive 
manufacturing. Ownership of a complementary asset—rather than contracting for it—is 
recommended if the focal innovation’s appropriability regime is weak or the complementary asset 
is not available in competitive supply. 
One can draw a useful analogy between the concept of complementary assets and IP 
modularity. Just as control of a critical complementary asset may compensate for a weak 
appropriability regime, placing two components in one module may allow the strong IP protection 
of one to compensate for weak IP protection of the other. The precondition for such extension of 
protection is that it must be technologically possible to tightly link the two components— i.e., 
integration must be a technological option. 
Inkjet printers serve well to illustrate this point. On the highest level, they consist of two 
modules, an ink tank/cartridge and the remainder of the printer. Replacement purchases of  
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consumable ink links revenues to the cartridge. The critical question from a product architecture 
perspective is where to place the printhead. Cost considerations suggest bundling it with the 
printer, since printheads have longer useful lifetimes than ink cartridges. Yet, HP and Canon chose 
to draw the module boundary differently, integrating the printhead with the cartridge. Their 
rationale was that a “minimal” cartridge, without the printhead, would be easy to imitate. It would 
thus be an “involuntarily open” module. The printhead, in contrast, is quite effectively protected 
by patents. Integrating both components in one module made the cartridges much more difficult to 
imitate, and effectively extended the printhead’s IP protection to the cartridge. This move 
prevented cartridges from being made by competing suppliers, and thus secured the revenues 
linked to the cartridge for the makers of the printer. Integrating the printhead with the simple 
cartridge created a proprietary IP module that was strongly protected because it was difficult to 
imitate legally. Note that, in this case, IP considerations suggested merging two modules, while in 
the case of M-Systems they suggested splitting a module. 
Introducing IP Modularity 
To elucidate the concept of “IP modularity,” we must introduce the notions of “IP status” 
and of “IP incompatibility.”  
A module’s IP status describes the legal rights to and de facto accessibility of knowledge 
embodied in the module. State-granted property rights and characteristics of the technology define 
the “maximum” of protection that the module owner can establish. From this basis, he can 
selectively waive or transfer some of his rights and grant access to knowledge, where “selectively” 
refers both to the level of information sharing and to the recipients. For example, the module 
owner may keep knowledge related to the module secret, make it available to select parties, 
disclose it publicly while asserting patents on it, or disclose it freely to all interested parties. Recall 
the case of M-Systems described above. The original flash memory driver had the IP status 
“binary code copyright protected, source code kept secret.” After introduction of the IP-modular 
architecture the flash management software maintained this status, while the thin driver had the IP 
status “source code open, far-reaching rights granted to others according to the GPL.
18”  
Building on this definition, we say that IP incompatibility exists between two elements of a 
system if their IP statuses lead to conflicting obligations or appropriability. Consider the following 
example. A software developer obtains code from two sources: from a commercial supplier, under 
a typical proprietary license; and from an open source repository, licensed under the General  
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Public License (GPL). The proprietary license prohibits passing on the human-readable source 
code to any third party. The GPL stipulates that any user of a program derived from GPL-licensed 
code is entitled to obtain the source code, read it, modify it, and pass both source and binary code 
on to others.
19 Interweaving the commercially licensed code and the open source code then leads 
to conflicting legal requirements. Thus, the two licensed-in blocks of code exhibit “IP 
incompatibility.”  
The above example involved external IP, that is, IP obtained under license from others. But 
there can also be incompatibility in the firm’s own IP. For M-Systems, the flash management 
software needed strong IP protection (realized by copyright and secrecy) to minimize the risk of 
imitation. But the driver code needed to be open—accessible to those who would integrate the 
flash memory into their devices. Thus, the two parts of the system exhibited IP incompatibility in 
that the desired IP status for one was incompatible with the desired IP status for the other. In the 
cartridge/printhead example, in contrast, the two components were IP compatible because the focal 
firm wished to make both proprietary. 
With these definitions, we are now in a position to introduce “IP modularity” formally. We 
define an “IP-modular” system architecture as one in which the technical boundaries of modules 
are co-extensive with IP status. That is, if IP incompatibilities are present within the system, then 
they exist only between, but not within modules. For the braking and stability system described in 
the Introduction, this condition would not have been fulfilled had it been designed as one module: 
the automaker’s stability system had the intended status “own IP, secret and copyrighted (and 
likely patented),” while the braking system had the status “owned by the supplier.”  
For illustration, let A and B in Figure 1 refer to incompatible forms of IP. The system 
shown in Figure 1(a) then is not IP-modular, while the one shown in Figure 1(b) is: a module 
boundary has been introduced that separates elements under different IP status. IP modularity may 
also be achieved by shifting a module boundary, as shown in Figure 2. Both 2(a) and 2(b) show 
modular systems, but only 2(b) is also IP modular.  
---- Insert Figures 1, 2 about here ---- 
We need to point out two trade-offs. Even though the modularity of a product or process 
and its IP modularity are largely under the control of product or process architects, neither type of 
modularity comes free. Strict product or process modularity with well-defined boundaries and  
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interfaces is costly to achieve and maintain. Similarly, segregating different chunks of knowledge 
according to their IP status is more expensive than pursuing the lowest-cost technical solution. 
Thus an IP-modular system may not be optimal from an engineering standpoint. Both for M-
Systems’ driver and for the automakers stability system, a one-module solution would likely have 
been technically superior. For the cartridge/printhead system, a two-module solution would have 
been less costly since the printhead would not be replaced with each change of ink. Thus the 
optimal modular structure for capturing value is not necessarily the same as the optimal structure 
for creating value. There is a tension between value creation and value capture, and a need to trade 
off benefits and costs.  
IP Modularity with Own IP 
We now illustrate and enrich the concepts introduced above with further case examples 
from practice, summarized in Table 1. We start with “own IP,” that is, circumstances in which the 
focal innovator has to align the modular architecture of its system with the IP status that it desires 
to convey to the various parts of the system. We will then discuss the management of “external 
IP,” that is, how to incorporate IP owned by others within the system. 
---- Insert Table 1 about here ---- 
Resources in the Surrounding Ecosystem 
We described M-System’s redesign of its flash memory product in the Introduction. 
Importantly for our argument, the redesign was costly in several ways. The company had to 
rewrite its software, redesign the physical memory device, and implement the new product design 
in their production facility. However, by simplifying the integration of its flash memory into 
mobile devices, the firm facilitated external value co-creation by device manufacturers and open 
source developers. To summarize: 
Potential for value co-creation in the ecosystem. Whenever the potential for value co-
creation exists in the surrounding ecosystem, distributing own IP into relatively 
unprotected “open” modules and highly protected “closed” modules will be 
advantageous.  
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The benefits of IP modularity also depend on the extent to which the pertinent resources 
are widely distributed. If potential co-creators of value are unknown to the focal firm or if the 
quality of their efforts cannot be determined in advance, then their contributions cannot be secured 
by means of standard contracts (including IP licenses). In such cases, unilaterally conveying 
knowledge and related IP rights to all comers via unprotected open modules may be the only way 
for the focal firm to gain access to these resources. At the same time, to maintain exclusivity, the 
focal firm must protect some of its own IP, and thus an IP modular architecture is called for.  
 Many computer chip manufacturers, like Nvidia, provide a “reference design” which 
includes a sample hardware layout and the software that is needed, such as the software code that 
is required for the chip to function, generally called “drivers,” into an open module. They split 
their own IP: they keep the majority proprietary, and publish open modules that include all the 
designs, electronic files, and test programs that a card manufacturer might need. Most graphics 
cards, most router designs, wireless network components, and other electronic devices today are 
such reference designs that the company gives away as open IP. To summarize: 
Distributed co-creators. The more distributed, numerous, and anonymous the co-
creators of value, the more advantageous it is to establish an IP modular system made 
up of unprotected open modules and protected closed modules. 
It is worth noting the link between this principle and so-called “platform strategies.” In a 
“platform architecture,” certain components (the platform) remain fixed, while others (the 
complements) are permitted to vary.
20 This strategy permits the focal firm to give control over the 
design of complements to users or third parties. A platform strategy is a specific instance of IP 
modularization in the sense that, as MacCormack and Iansiti describe, the platform owner will 
often award a proprietary IP status to the core of the platform, and a more open IP status to the 
interfaces that allows others to link complementary components to it.
21 
IP modularity is especially important when customer needs are heterogeneous and 
unpredictable. One way to accommodate customers’ demand for variety is for the focal firm to 
provide a list of features or options that customers may select. However, this approach is often 
very costly, and still may not cover the full range of customer needs or desires. Similarly, granting 
each user individual rights for the modifications he or she desires would incur high transaction 
costs.   
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Another way to address heterogeneous and unpredictable user needs is again to split the 
system and the related own IP into open and closed modules. This is effectively what firms do 
when they provide customers with “toolkits” or “application programming interfaces (APIs)” 
supporting customization and user modification.
22 Users’ modifications may then range from 
minor changes to entirely new modules. Most modern computer operating systems offer modules 
that are separate from the main operating system that are blocks of reusable code to make it easier 
for programmers to develop new applications. These modules usually perform functions for well-
known tasks, and they are dynamically loaded at runtime, when the finished program runs. 
Another example is in the Java operating system. Its owner (Sun Microsystems, now a part of 
Oracle) provides class libraries that offer an abstract interface to tasks. Programmers can use these 
as they build their own custom modules. In summary: 
Customization. The greater and more varied the need for customer adaptations, the 
more advantageous it is to establish an IP modular system made up of unprotected open 
modules and protected closed modules. 
Avoiding IP Leakage vis a vis Suppliers, Employees and Alliance Partners  
Value co-creation need not refer only to innovation; distributed production is also an 
important element of today’s economy.
23 When a firm outsources a large portion of its production 
to external suppliers or alliance partners, or when it provides critical knowledge to employees, it 
must be concerned that it is giving opportunistic agents precisely the knowledge they need to 
compete in its own markets. However, in a distributed production system, each participant only 
needs knowledge relevant to the modules it designs or builds.
24 Thus, if the focal firm divides the 
work among different agents who do not exchange information with each other, critical IP can be 
protected. Each agent will know part of the puzzle, but none can reconstruct the whole. IP 
modularity in this case requires breaking up the product design or production process into different 
task modules, and allocating those modules to separate, non-communicating agents.
25 
Recall the case of the automaker presented earlier. Purely technical considerations had 
suggested integrating the stability control system with the braking system. However, this 
integration of the automaker’s own IP with the supplier’s IP would have exposed the former to the 
risk of leakage, since the integrated module would have been in the hands of the supplier. 
Encapsulating the stability system as a separate module allowed the automaker to avoid this risk.    
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While the case of the brake system is about IP-modularizing a product to avoid leakage of 
IP, the production of Michelin tires illustrates how the architecture of a process may be adapted to 
that same purpose. As Julia P. Liebeskind describes: “During the 1960s, Michelin had a monopoly 
on knowledge relating to the production of high quality steel-belted radial tire manufacturing. In 
order to preserve this monopoly, manufacturing was divided into two separate processes: steel 
belt manufacturing, and tire production. Employees were not rotated between these manufacturing 
processes in a deliberate effort to restrict the number of employees that had knowledge about both 
processes. As a result, only a handful of very senior managers within Michelin were 
knowledgeable about the entire manufacturing process. More subordinate individuals within the 
organization would need to collaborate in order to obtain knowledge valuable to rivals.”
26 
A similar approach to process has been applied to commercial jet engines.
27 These engines 
employ multiple stages, a “cold” section which is at the front of the engine that employs low 
pressure turbines that move large volumes of air, intermediate stages, and a high pressure “hot 
section” where the fuel is burned. The hot section of advanced engines is highly proprietary, as the 
turbine blades often operate beyond the melting temperature of the metal alloys that they are 
constructed from, so they employ proprietary cooling techniques and ceramic coatings. Major 
engine manufacturers may source components for the low pressure sections, or even some of the 
high pressure sections, and maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) operations can tear down 
and reassemble engines. But big engine manufacturers like GE Aviation jealously guard the 
production of the hot section components, even spreading their manufacture across multiple 
locations. 
The F101 engine was developed by GE Aviation for the B-1 bomber, but when the 
opportunity arose to build a “10 ton” class high bypass commercial engine (with 10 tons or 20,000 
lbs of thrust) in partnership with SNECMA of France, GE had to apply for an export license. The 
Department of State’s Office of Munitions Control recommended rejection of the license on 
national security grounds because of the proprietary hot section, and also because the F101 had 
been built with U.S. taxpayer funds. GE and SNECMA did not give up their goal of partnership, 
however, and eventually the issue was escalated to a summit meeting between Presidents Nixon of 
the U.S. and Pompidou of France in Reykjavík in 1973. The solution agreed to was for GE to build 
the core hot section in the U.S., and export it to France where the low pressure section was added.  
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This deliberate modularization of process-related IP protected the appropriability of the hot 
section.
28  
Modularity based on the logic of “divide and rule” can strengthen IP protection in 
otherwise weak appropriability regimes. However, in such cases, the principles for designing an 
IP-modular system are different from those used to attract value-co-creation or address 
heterogeneous customer needs. As before, all IP within a given module should have the same IP 
status. But instead of creating purely “open” and “closed” modules, each module now has the IP 
status “open to supplier, employee group, or alliance partner X, closed to all others.” In designing 
its products and related processes, the focal firm must tailor a set of discrete modules with 
divisible tasks and non-overlapping IP. Production of each of these modules can then be allocated 
to different suppliers, alliance partners, or business units within the firm. In summary: 
Avoiding IP leakage. When the focal firm must rely on opportunistic suppliers, alliance 
partners, and/or employees and its IP is not strongly appropriable, distributing own IP 
into discrete, non-overlapping modules with little or no stand-alone value and 
allocating responsibility for each module to a different firm or business unit will be 
advantageous.  
Extending control: When not to divide own IP 
Our analysis thus far has dealt with circumstances in which it is advantageous for the focal 
firm to divide its own IP into “open” and “closed” modules or a set of modules open to distinct 
recipients. But as the case of inkjet printers clearly showed, it is sometimes desirable to integrate 
components and IP that might otherwise have been kept separate. Thus achieving IP modularity 
might require combining elemental IP as well as dividing it. In particular, we argued, melding a 
component that has good revenue potential but weak appropriability with another that has less 
revenue potential but strong appropriability can be advantageous for value capture.  
As a second example of this principle, consider the decade-long conflict between Intel and 
AMD over IP related to microprocessors. When IBM selected the Intel 8088 microprocessor for its 
Personal Computer in 1981, it required that Intel enable a second-source supplier because it did 
not want to be dependent on a sole source. Intel entered into a ten-year technology exchange 
agreement with Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). The companies amended their contract in 1984  
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to allow AMD to be a second-source for following generations of the “x86” processor architecture 
in exchange for substantial royalties to Intel.
29 
Beginning in 1983, responding to the superior performance of AMD’s processors, Intel 
began a strategy to wall off its IP, triggering multiyear court proceedings. When Intel eventually 
had to settle in 1995, it launched several initiatives to effectively move the boundary of its IP so 
that it could secure stronger appropriability. In particular, it changed the microprocessor’s 
instruction set to incorporate Intel’s “MMX” instructions, effectively moving functionality from 
software into hardware. AMD then had to reverse engineer the new microprocessors to maintain 
compatibility. Intel also started changing the sockets that each generation of processor plugged 
into, so that AMD would not be able to share the infrastructure of complements provided by 
motherboard manufacturers. Thus, similar to HP’s and Canon’s strategy of integrating the 
printhead with the cartridge, Intel integrated proprietary elements (the MMX instruction set and its 
socket design) with the “relatively open” component (the processor itself, which under the terms 
of the settlement it was required to share with AMD). In this fashion, the IP protection of the 
proprietary components was extended to the more open components of the integrated chip. 
Through this strategy, with its “Intel Inside” marketing campaign, in the late 1990s, Intel was able 
to achieve a position of market dominance in microprocessors for PCs. We summarize: 
When not to divide own IP. Merging elements of own IP under weak appropriability 
with other elements under strong appropriability into one module may allow extending 
the strong appropriability to the former, thus securing the former’s revenue potential. 
IP Modularity with External IP 
We now turn to situations in which the focal firm does not control the IP status of some 
components of its system. However, it can control its system’s technical architecture (subject to 
physical and cost constraints) and use modularity to mitigate various IP-related concerns.  
Distributed Ownership of External IP 
When dealing with external IP, transaction costs may be high simply because the upstream 
co-creators of value are distributed and numerous. If in addition, inconsistent legal or contractual 
restrictions create incompatibility between different “chunks” of incoming IP within modules 
(hence, if the architecture is not IP modular), transaction costs can be particularly high. This  
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problem arose at Sun Microsystems when it moved to license key implementations of its Java 
programming language as open source software. The technology magazine eWeek quotes Sun 
General Counsel Mike Dillon, saying the transition was tedious and legalistic: “Java Standard 
Edition contains about 6 million lines of code. […] Our legal team [of 190 lawyers] had to go 
over it, line by line, and look for all copyright marks and third-party involvements. Where Sun 
didn’t have the correct licenses, we had to contact the owners, one by one, and determine the 
rights.”
30. 
In Sun’s case, the problem was caused not by the opportunism of a single supplier, but by 
the sheer multitude and variety of IP sources. Such multiplicity of sources is now a common 
occurrence in large software systems. It may give rise to incompatibilities between different 
chunks of incoming IP and between the firm’s incoming and own IP. In particular, the 
entanglement of incoming commercial IP with the firm’s own IP creates a headache when, for 
strategic reasons, the focal firm wants to release part or all of its system as open source software to 
instigate external value creation. 
We conclude that when a firm has many diverse sources of incoming IP, it should reduce 
the impact of IP incompatibilities by designing its whole system—whether it be a codebase, a 
product, or a process—in an IP-modular fashion. With software, doing so may even be a 
contractual obligation since, as discussed above, open source and commercial licenses often 
impose contradictory requirements on the licensee. In summary:  
Distributed ownership of external IP. IP modularity with external IP is advantageous 
when the focal firm obtains IP on different terms from diverse sources. Module 
boundaries should be placed to ensure IP-compatibility within modules and to minimize 
the costs of renegotiation. In particular, it should be possible to change the IP status of 
a module without renegotiating numerous IP licenses.  
Hold-up Risk 
Integration of own with external IP may be particularly problematic because of the risk of 
holdup. LaMantia, Cai, MacCormack, and Rusnak describe a software company whose entire 
product family depended on a central platform component.
31 This platform contained both the 
company’s own code and code licensed-in from another software vendor. Furthermore, the 
platform was designed in an integral fashion, with the licensed-in code spread throughout the  
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codebase. Thus, it was not IP-modular. It would have been very difficult to separate the licensed-in 
code from the company’s own code on short notice. When the license came up for renewal, this 
fact would have exposed the firm to “holdup” on the part of the licensor.
32  
Anticipating this threat, the focal firm re-modularized the codebase, placing a newly 
designed platform and the licensed-in code in separate modules. Although the system required 
both modules, the platform module no longer contained, nor did it depend on, any licensed-in 
code. As a result, the focal firm’s switching cost was greatly reduced, and risk of holdup was 
largely eliminated. We summarize: 
Holdup risk. IP modularity with external IP is advantageous when the focal firm faces 
the risk of holdup from IP suppliers. The module boundaries should go between the 
firm’s own IP and the external IP. 
Extending Control: When to Avoid Modularity with External IP 
As in the case of a firm’s own IP, it may be preferable to avoid modular designs using 
external IP and instead integrate two or more components into one module. The rationale is similar 
in both cases: by tightly integrating a “relatively open” component with a component under strong 
appropriability, the latter also affords protection to the open component. If the open component is 
external, then such integration may allow the focal firm to establish control of it. 
As an example, consider the tactics of “embrace, extend, extinguish.” This term describes 
the practice to embrace an open standard, add proprietary extensions, and then use market power 
to extinguish the original, open version. Microsoft has repeatedly been accused of employing this 
tactics, for example with the Java programming language, the encryption technology Kerberos, 
and Web standards.
33 Interpreted in the context of IP modularity, the firm tried to integrate an IP-
protected component (its proprietary extension) with an open, external component (the open 
standard) into one “module” in order to gain control of the external IP under consideration. We 
summarize this approach in general terms as follows:  
Establishing control of external open IP through integration with own IP. Integrating 
an “open” component under external IP with an own component under strong 
appropriability into one module may allow to establish control of the open component.  
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The effect of uncertainty 
Uncertainty may compound the various considerations that played a role so far. By creating IP-
modular designs, firms gain the ability to change their IP strategy in specific parts of the system in 
response to new value-capture opportunities or to threat of expropriation. Thus, IP modularity 
creates option value.  
Uncertainty and Own IP 
Consider the example of the operating system Darwin, originated by Apple Inc.
34 
Originally, Apple kept the code that later became Darwin proprietary, thus from an IP perspective 
there was no reason not to adopt an integral design. However, in 2000 Apple made large parts of 
Darwin’s source code—but not all of it—publicly available under an open source license, to take 
advantage of distributed value creation.
35 As we have explained earlier, IP modularity is desirable 
in such circumstances, but it is typically difficult and expensive to implement ex post. To the 
extent that Apple anticipated this move when designing the system, it might have built into the 
program’s architecture the option of selectively changing the IP status of certain parts. That is, it 
may have performed an “anticipatory” IP modularization by creating a design that featured a high, 
seemingly excessive degree of modularity.  
Generally, in settings characterized by high levels of technological or market uncertainty, 
changes in the external environment can arise after the fact that make IP-modularity desirable. As 
in the case of M-Systems, customers may require openness of some of the product’s IP as a 
condition of purchase. Alternatively, outsourcing of production may become attractive for cost 
reasons. An “overly modular” initial design allows the focal firm to respond to such changes 
rapidly and cost-effectively. We note:  
Uncertainty and Own IP. An “overly modular” product or process architecture creates 
options to capture value in the future by selectively adapting the IP status of individual 
modules. Such options for IP modularity of own IP are more valuable in the presence of 
high market or technological uncertainty. 
Inadvertent infringement 
When the focal firm uses external IP that is subject to uncertainty, IP modularity again 
creates option value. We have already explained that IP modularity is a way to counter a known 
threat of holdup. Today firms are increasingly vulnerable to IP-related threats that cannot be  
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predicted when the product or process architecture is chosen. For a complex new product or 
process in fields like electronics and software, it is often impossible to identify with certainty all 
patents that the product might infringe. Non-practicing entities (often referred to as “patent 
“trolls”) enforce patents, often acquired ones, against firms that—typically unwittingly—use the 
technology covered by the patent.
36 A key aspect of the trolls’ strategy is surprise: they wait until 
the IP-related product or process is successful before filing suit, thus maximizing the value of any 
future damages or settlement. For example, Forgent Networks collected, in less than three years, 
more than US$100 million in licensing fees after suing users of the JPEG standard for 
infringement of one of its patents.
37 
One way to counter a patent infringement suit is to “design around” the patent by replacing 
the allegedly infringing component with a non-infringing substitute. Design-arounds are less costly 
when the underlying product or process is modular.
38 As long as the infringement is confined to 
one (or a few) modules, those modules can be redesigned or even removed without compromising 
the functionality of the rest of the system.  
The MPEG-4 compression standard for audio and video data is a case in point.
39 MPEG-4 
is not a single technology, but rather a collection of methods and so-called “parts.” For each 
application, MPEG-4 is implemented by generating a specific “profile” that assembles the parts 
(“modules” in our context) required for it. The modular structure of MPEG-4 allows firms, in 
defining a “profile,” to leave out parts with a high perceived IP uncertainty. Furthermore, when 
components under uncertain IP status are encapsulated into a separate module of the product, it 
will be easier to replace or even drop them if it turns out that they infringe on so far unidentified 
patents. This leads to our last recommendation:  
Inadvertent infringement. A product or process architecture characterized by IP 
modularity is a partial defense against unanticipated external IP claims, because it 
gives the firm options to “design around” the claims without redesigning the whole 
system.  
Conclusions 
In order to optimize value capture from a new product or process, an innovator must 
manage the artifact’s IP and its modular structure in conjunction. Each module’s IP status needs to 
be defined carefully and its boundaries must be placed accordingly. Based on theoretical  
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arguments and case studies from various industries we have derived the following insights. With 
own IP, IP modularity helps to reconcile distributed value creation with value capture, and to 
avoid IP leakage to suppliers and employees. With external IP, an IP-modular architecture reduces 
holdup risk and other transaction costs of licensing, and may allow a firm to establish control over 
external, originally open IP. Finally, under uncertainty, “anticipatory” IP modularity creates option 
value: it allows a firm to better exploit upcoming opportunities for distributed value creation and 
to counter threats from inadvertent IP infringement. 
In concluding, we want to point out generalizations of the concept of “IP modularity,” 
discuss a number of caveats, and summarize. 
For clarity in exposition, we have focused on IP modularity in the products firms sell and 
the processes they use. However, the concept extends to organizations. “Chinese Walls” are an 
illustrative example.
40 This term refers to virtual barriers between different organizational units 
that prevent information exchange between these units—the advisory and trading departments of a 
bank, for example. These units, in our notion, constitute “IP modules” within the organization, and 
the Chinese Walls between them are module boundaries.  
A second generalization concerns the rights and obligations under consideration. While we 
focused on IP as an important source of such rights and obligations, the latter may also have other 
legal or contractual origins. For example, the need to clearly attribute liability in case of product 
failures may, in a similar way to IP, give rise to a modular architecture. In safety-critical products, 
modules may be segregated due to differing safety certification levels. Classified data may need to 
be stored and processed separately from unclassified data, again suggesting a modular 
architecture.
41 
Before closing the paper, we must emphasize two caveats. First, IP modularity is likely to 
increase the cost of design, require legal clarifications, and may imply a loss of performance. IP 
strategists must evaluate these costs in relation to the benefits of IP modularity in terms of higher 
value capture. Second, in some circumstances, even with a modular product or process 
architecture, IP modularity may not be necessary. For example, if a company’s strategy for 
appropriating value rests heavily on ownership of complementary assets, that company may not 
need IP protection. Similarly, trust between organizations reduces the risk of opportunistic 
behavior, and thus may reduce the need to pursue IP modularity.   
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In conclusion, in this paper we have explored the concept of IP modularity. Fundamentally, 
IP modularity eliminates incompatibilities between IP rights in a given module, while permitting 
incompatibilities within the overall system. This in turn permits a firm to “have its cake and eat it 
too,” that is, it can reap the benefits of an open architecture while at the same time reducing the 
costs of opportunism on the part of suppliers, complementors and employees. In this fashion, IP 
modularity overcomes intrinsic conflicts between distributed value creation on the one hand, and 
value appropriation on the other hand.  
The reconciliation of technical architecture with IP assignments is increasingly important. 
The management of formal IP in the form of patents and copyrights has become an essential aspect 
of the management of innovation. But at the same time, there is movement in the opposite 
direction: open and semi-open innovation processes are steadily gaining ground in a number of 
industries. The details of IP modularization must be determined by engineers and legal experts 
working together. But beyond the technical and legal concerns, IP modularity affects a firm’s 
strategies for value appropriation in increasingly complex and fragmented technological spaces. It 
is an issue that deserves the attention of general managers and management scholars generally.  
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Figure 1. Systems with integral (a) and IP-modular (b) structure. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Systems with modular (a) and IP-modular (b) structure. 
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